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ABSTRACT 
The predominant method for collecting delinquent real estate taxes in Massachusetts 
is the use of the “tax deed” as authorized by Chapter 60, Sections 53-54. Under the 
authorized procedures, each municipality’s tax collector can execute and record a 
deed that transfers fee simple title to the real estate to the municipality subject to the 
taxpayer’s statutorily created redemption right. If the redemption right is or cannot 
be exercised, all of the taxpayer’s rights in the property, as well as other’s rights 
created by encumbrances such as mortgages, are terminated by the foreclosure 
process provided for in the statute. Importantly, the municipality does not obtain title 
to the taxpayer’s land by foreclosure; instead, it merely frees itself of any remaining 
claim by the taxpayer. 
The problem with the tax deed procedure is that it fails to provide both procedural 
and substantive due process to the taxpayer. Procedurally, although adequate notice 
is given, title to the taxpayer’s real estate is taken by the government without a 
hearing. Based on an unreviewed decision by a municipal tax collector, the taxpayer 
immediately loses title to the land. Substantively, by using a tax deed, the 
municipality engages in the taking of property without providing reasonable 
compensation. The value of the land taken for payment of the tax debt is not 
evaluated in the context of the debt owed. Empirical evidence shows that the 
property’s value significantly exceeds the debt owed, giving the municipality the 
ability to collect almost fifty dollars for every dollar of delinquent real estate tax 
owed, on average. Each year, approximately $56,000,000 is unconstitutionally 
appropriated from taxpayers. This Article will explore these problems 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
unicipalities must be able to collect overdue real estate taxes 
efficiently, but must do so in a constitutional way. 
Unfortunately, significant due process problems subsist in the primary 
method used to collect these unpaid taxes in Massachusetts.1 This 
paper discusses these problems. 
Most commonly, a Massachusetts municipality2 uses a “tax deed” 
that is executed by the tax collector and recorded on the land records.3 
Using this document, the municipal officer transfers title to the land 
from the taxpayer to the town, subject to a right to redeem title if the 
taxpayer satisfies the tax debt and associated costs.4 If the tax debt is 
not paid, Massachusetts law uses strict foreclosure to extinguish the 
remaining title held by the taxpayer, known as the right of 
redemption.5 The result of this process is that the municipality acquires 
title to the land free and clear of all other claims being made against 
                                                            
1 See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60 (2012) (outlining the procedures 
available to collect real estate taxes). 
2 As is common throughout the United States, real estate taxes are imposed at the 
local level. See Glenn W. Fisher, History of Property Taxes in the United States, 
ECON. HIST. ASS’N, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-property-taxes-in-the-
united-states/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/Q5Z9-GXUL]. In 
Massachusetts, this is the city or town in which the property is located. See 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 2A (2012) (imposing duties on the “assessor[] of 
each city and town”). 
3 See ch. 60, § 54. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. § 53 (“If a tax on land is not paid . . . the collector may take such land for 
the town . . . .”). Where a lien holder is given title to the property affected by the 
security device rather than having the property sold and taking the money 
generated, it is known as a “strict foreclosure.” See, e.g., Wornat Dev. Corp. v. 
Vakalis, 529 N.E.2d 1329, 1330 n.4 (Mass. 1988) (“Generally, in a decree of 
strict foreclosure of a mortgage, a court determines the amount a defaulting 
mortgagor owes and orders the mortgagor to pay this amount to the mortgagee 
within a specific time. If the mortgagor fails to make the payment, the decree 
extinguishes the mortgagor’s right of redemption and vests title absolutely in the 
mortgagee. No sale of the property takes place.” (citations omitted)). In the 
minority of states recognizing the remedy, it is generally limited to those 
circumstances where a foreclosure by sale is unlikely to generate a financial 
return to the fee title holder. Cf. Bradford Realty Corp. v. Beetz, 142 A. 395, 397 
(Conn. 1928) (“As no equity in the property over and above the first mortgage 
[existed] . . . the trial court wisely refused, in the exercise of its discretion, to 
impose upon the plaintiff the additional cost and expense of a foreclosure by 
sale.”). 
M
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the property.6 While this process is not fundamentally unsound in 
theory, as implemented in Massachusetts, it leads directly to an 
unconstitutional taking of property by the municipality. A hypothetical 
will illustrate: 
Assume a taxpayer owes a small amount of money to 
the municipality, say $400.00.7 Also assume that the 
real estate has a market value of about $375,000.8 For 
whatever reason, the property owner fails to pay the 
$400.00 bill.9 Following the procedures described 
below, the municipality takes tax title and then 
forecloses any redemption rights that the taxpayer may 
have had.10 The town now has absolute title to the 
property and all of the taxpayer’s rights have been 
terminated. In other words, to satisfy a $400.00 debt, 
the taxpayer will surrender property worth almost 
1,000 times more and the town obtains a windfall of 
$374,600. 
Of course, as a general matter, the government is not allowed to 
appropriate private property without due process of law.11 A failure of 
                                                            
6 See generally Robert J. Kerwin, Municipal Collection by Foreclosure of Tax 
Title, 83 MASS. L. REV. 77 (1998). 
7 This small of a claim is not unusual as unpaid municipal water and utility bills 
can be treated as property taxes under Massachusetts law. See MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 164, § 58B & ch. 60, §§ 23, 43 (2012). In the empirical study [hereinafter 
“Foreclosure Data”] done as part of this project, the smallest tax debt that was 
enforced by a tax deed was $26. This file, 13 TL 147312, resulted in the 
foreclosure of the taxpayer’s redemption rights on a property with an assessed 
value of $24,100, a ratio of 927 to 1. See Foreclosure Data (available upon 
request to the author). 
8 The median price of a single-family house in Massachusetts as of June 30, 2017, 
was $375,500.00. Massachusetts Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW, 
http://www.zillow.com/ma/home-values/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/A7LU-K9PW]. 
9 A common reason for not paying a bill this small is that the property owner has 
become incompetent due to age or illness. See, e.g., Tallage LLC v. Meaney, 
2015 WL 4207424, at *2, 23 LCR (Landlaw) 375 (Mass. Land Ct. 2015). 
10 See infra Part II. 
11 Two federal constitutional provisions establish due process rights, the Fifth 
Amendment for federal actions, see, e.g., Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 
(1971), and the Fourteenth Amendment for state actions, see, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 
424 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1976). In Massachusetts, Articles 1, 10, and 12 of the 
Declaration of Rights and Part II, ch. 1 of the Constitution provide these rights. 
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due process can result from insufficient procedures where either 
proper notice is not given or an opportunity to be heard by a neutral 
magistrate is not provided.12 A due process deprivation can also occur 
when private property is taken without just compensation.13 As this 
article will establish, the Massachusetts tax deed procedure fails to 
satisfy these requirements. Although the tax deed statute requires 
notice to the taxpayer before the taking, it allows the taking to be 
effectuated without a hearing. Further, if the municipality subsequently 
forecloses the right of redemption, property significantly higher in 
value than the tax debt is taken without cause. In summary, of the 
three due process requirements—notice, hearing and compensation—
Massachusetts satisfies only the first. 
The next section contains a description of the process used to 
collect unpaid property taxes. Then, empirical evidence defining the 
scope of the problem is presented. The final section compares the 
Massachusetts procedure with constitutional norms and finds tax deeds 
under Chapter 60 lacking. 
II. THE MASSACHUSETTS “TAX DEED” PROCESS 
The procedures available for collecting delinquent real estate taxes 
owed to the municipality of the locus are set out in Chapter 60 of the 
General Laws.14 There are multiple remedies provided including 
bringing suit on the debt,15 presenting the claim against the estate of a 
deceased taxpayer,16 placing a lien on the property and selling that 
lien,17 taking title for nonpayment of taxes,18 and even arresting the 
                                                                                                                                            
See, e.g., Moe v. Sec’y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Mass. 1981); 
Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 601 n.8 (Mass. 1971). 
12 See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) 
(requiring “that deprivation of . . . property by adjudication be preceded by 
notice and opportunity for hearing . . . .”). 
13 See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960) (requiring 
compensation when property value is destroyed). 
14 See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60 (2012); see generally DOUGLAS A. 
RANDALL & DOUGLAS F. FRANKLIN, Municipal Law and Practice, in 18B 
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES ch. 37(C) (5th ed. 2006). 
15 See § 35. 
16 See id. § 36. 
17 See id. § 37. 
18 See id. § 53. 
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taxpayer.19 The choice of which remedy to pursue is the tax 
collector’s; indeed, a tax collector can pursue multiple avenues 
simultaneously.20 The most common remedy used—and the subject of 
this article—is the process by which the municipality seizes title to the 
taxpayer’s land using a tax deed.21 
The procedure set forth for a municipality to use a tax deed to take 
title for nonpayment of real estate taxes is straightforward. The 
relevant statute is Section 53 of Chapter 60, which starts: 
If a tax on land is not paid within fourteen days after 
demand therefor and remains unpaid at the date of 
taking, the collector may take such land for the town, 
first giving fourteen days’ notice of his intention to 
exercise such power of taking, which notice may be 
served in the manner required by law for the service of 
subpoenas on witnesses in civil cases or may be 
published, and shall conform to the requirements of 
section forty. He shall also, fourteen days before the 
taking, post a notice so conforming in two or more 
convenient and public places.22 
In other words, a demand for payment of the outstanding taxes 
must be made, fourteen days must pass, formal notice that a taking will 
occur must be served,23 and then fourteen days later the “collector may 
take such land for the town.”24 
It is important to recognize that the municipality is not asserting a 
security device under Section 53; instead, title to the property is taken 
outright and the former title holder’s interest (most commonly a fee 
                                                            
19 See id. § 29. 
20 See Forbes & Wallace, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 486 N.E.2d 1134, 1137 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (“The remedies for the collection of a real estate tax are 
cumulative.”). 
21 William P. Cowin & Daniel C. Hill, Tax Title Sales & Tax Title Issues, MASS. 
COLLECTORS & TREASURERS SCHOOL 3 (Aug. 13, 2015), 
http://mcta.virtualtownhall.net/pages/MCTA_AnnualSchool/required/Course-
1006-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/53QY-6F52]. 
22 § 53. 
23 See generally Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) 
(noting that the standards for service apply and individualized notice must be 
used whenever possible). 
24 § 53; see generally RANDALL & FRANKLIN, supra note 14, at § 37.40. 
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simple absolute) is reduced to a right of redemption.25 The town can 
take “immediate possession” of the property.26 If the taxpayer seeks to 
regain possession, a suit can be brought in equity, but the full burden 
of proof is placed on the title holder.27 The town is not liable for any 
damages that occur during the town’s possession of the land.28 If the 
property generates any rents or other income, the town may keep the 
money.29 Based on the statute’s words and its effect, the government 
has taken almost complete title from the former property owner. 
Significantly, there will have been no hearing held by a magistrate to 
determine the validity of the taking. The signature of the 
municipality’s tax collector is factually conclusive and immediately 
deprives the property owner of any interest.30 
Although title has transferred to the municipality, the taxpayer, as 
the former title holder, maintains a right of redemption.31 This right 
survives until such time as the Massachusetts Land Court32 enters a 
judgment foreclosing it.33 Until foreclosed, the taxpayer can redeem 
the property by paying the outstanding delinquent tax, at an interest 
rate of sixteen percent, and all charges lawfully added.34 As part of the 
judgment, the Land Court may add attorney’s fees if the taxpayer can 
afford to pay them.35 If not redeemed, however, because title to the 
land was taken without regards for the amount of taxes owed, the 
foreclosure gives the municipality the full value of the real estate and 
the taxpayer is left with nothing. 
                                                            
25 See § 53; RANDALL & FRANKLIN, supra note 14, at § 37.40 (“Title to the land 
taken will vest in the city or town, subject to the right of redemption . . . .”). 
26 § 53. 




30 See id. (“[T]he collector may take such land for the town . . . .”); see also id. 
§ 54 (“The instrument of taking shall be under the hand and seal of the 
collector . . . .”). The job duties of a tax collector are set forth in Section 2 of 
Chapter 60. There are no job qualifications statutorily imposed, leaving each 
municipality to hire whomever it wishes to serve in the job. See id. § 2. 
31 See id. § 62. 
32 Id. § 76 (giving exclusive jurisdiction over redemption to the Land Court). 
33 See id. § 62. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. § 65. 
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After foreclosure, the municipality’s title is absolute and the 
judgment forever bar[s] future attempts to redeem the property.36 In 
reality, however, for the first year after the foreclosure judgment is 
entered, it can be vacated by the Court.37 The statute does not 
enunciate the grounds that must be satisfied for a court to do so,38 but 
the Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) has indicated that “[t]he granting 
of the petition to vacate . . . rest[s] largely but not entirely in the 
discretion of the trial judge [and s]uch petitions are extraordinary in 
nature and ought to be granted only after careful consideration and in 
instances where they are required to accomplish justice.”39 
In summary, to recover delinquent taxes, the municipality takes the 
land without a hearing. No court or judicial officer determines if the 
municipality’s claim of a tax deficiency is accurate before the property 
is taken. Subsequently, should the taxpayer not redeem the property, 
its full value becomes the property of the town. The taxpayer cannot 
claim the difference between the amount that is owed and the amount 
that was taken. As the next section demonstrates, this difference is not 
small. 
                                                            
36 Id. § 64. 
37 Id. § 69A. 
38 Section 69A is written as a statute of limitations indicating when the right to 
bring a petition ends rather than as a section defining the right. See id.; Town of 
Easton v. Sprague & Reynolds Co., TL Case No. 91984, 7 LCR (Landlaw) 96 
(Mass. Land Ct. 1999). Despite this limit, where the challenge is raised on due 
process grounds, the courts have recognized an exception and allowed the 
challenge after the deadline passes. See, e.g., Town of Barnstable v. Unknown 
Owners, 2004 WL 2191215 at *5, 12 LCR (Landlaw) 390 (Mass. Land Ct. 
2004). 
39 Lynch v. City of Boston, 48 N.E.2d 26, 27 (Mass. 1943). There are not many 
cases where this section has been used. A search of the Landlaw’s LAND COURT 
REPORTER online case searching service, http://www.landlaw.com (fee based), 
returned 16 occasions that the Land Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction over 
tax foreclosures and redemptions, considered the section since 1993. Several 
cases where the Land Court did allow a redemption under Section 69A generally 
involved due process notice problems that had not been discovered before the 
judgment was entered; see, e.g., Town of Russell v. Barlow, 2016 WL 3745960, 
24 LCR (Landlaw) 404 (Mass. Land Ct. 2016); Others involved extreme health 
challenges faced by the former title holder that caused them to default; see, e.g., 
Tallage LLC v. Meaney, 2015 WL 4207424, 23 LCR (Landlaw) 375 (Mass. 
Land Ct. 2015). 
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III. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM: HOW MUCH PROPERTY IS BEING 
TAKEN? 
To determine the scope of the problem, a small empirical study 
was undertaken based on the public records of the Massachusetts Land 
Court.40 The Foreclosure Data comprises information from the files 
that are associated with every foreclosure that follows the tax taking. 
The data from one typical year41 are included; those redemption 
foreclosures filed on or after August 1, 2013 and on or before July 31, 
2014. This period was chosen to make the data set reflective of the 
current status of the foreclosure system based on a period where most 
of the suits associated with the tax taking were concluded with a final 
judgment so that complete data would be available.42 Because the 
number of foreclosures filed within the year was larger than could be 
practically processed,43 a random sample of just over five percent of 
these files were included in the Foreclosure Data. Overall, 114 files 
from the year were examined and detailed information about each case 
was extracted to build the database.44 
With the Foreclosure Data built, the scope of the problem being 
discussed in this article became apparent. For the year, Massachusetts 
municipalities collected approximately $56,600,000 more from their 
                                                            
40 The Land Court has exclusive jurisdiction in Massachusetts to foreclose the 
right of redemption that follows a tax taking. See § 64. Its foreclosure records, 
therefore, are comprehensive of all tax titles that entered the court system for the 
termination of the right of redemption. Id. 
41 Interview with Deborah J. Patterson, Land Court Recorder (Feb. 20, 2017) 
(stating that the tax foreclosures that occurred in the test period were typical for 
what the Land Court normally processes). The Recorder is the judicial officer 
within the Land Court who is responsible for hearing tax foreclosure and 
redemption matters. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 185, § 6 (2012). 
42 This was largely successful as 78.1% of the files in the sample had concluded. 
See Foreclosure Data, supra note 7. 
43 There were approximately 2,260 files within the year. This number was obtained 
by processing the docket numbers used by the Court, which are assigned 
sequentially. Consequently, the docket number of the last case in the year less 
the docket number of the first case gives the numbers of files opened. Because it 
is possible, though extremely unlikely, that a docket number was missed, there 
could be slightly fewer files than this. The files are on paper. Each docket 
number has a separate file folder that is available from the Land Court’s Clerk’s 
Office by that number. Processing each file to extract the data needed for this 
limited study took five to fifteen minutes each, excluding the time it would take 
for the Clerk to retrieve each file. Id. 
44 Id. 
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taxpayers than was owed. In other words, the towns and cities 
collected $42.87 for every dollar they were owed. The details follow. 
The average size of the tax lien being collected was $4,177 with a 
range from a low of $26 to a high of $66,642. The assessed property 
value45 averaged $258,462 with a range from $1,300 to $2,295,100. 
On average, the tax lien represented 1.62% of the assessed value of the 
property, with a range from 0.05% to 48.87% of the assessed value. 
Because a random sample of cases was used, an estimate of the overall 
value can be calculated.46 Thus, the taxes claimed in foreclosure cases 
during the year studied were approximately $9,439,000 against an 
assessed value of $584,125,000.47 
However, not every claim filed resulted in a foreclosure. Only 
15.79% of the foreclosure suits resulted in a judgment for the 
municipality.48 The overall estimated assessed value of those matters 
                                                            
45 Massachusetts law requires assessments at “fair cash valuation.” MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 59, § 38 (1979); see Tremont & Suffolk Mills v. City of Lowell, 39 
N.E. 1028, 1029 (Mass. 1895) (describing how to determine value by estimating 
current market valuation); Bennett v. Bd. of Assessors of Whitman, 237 N.E.2d 
7, 9 (Mass. 1968) (finding that assessing tax “at less than 100% of full fair cash 
value” was illegal); see generally RANDALL & FRANKLIN, supra note 14, at 
§ 36.24. Reassessments are done annually. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, 
§ 2A(a) (2008) (“The assessors of each city and town shall determine the fair 
cash valuation of . . . real property . . . on the first day of January of each year.”). 
Consequently, as a matter of law, the appraised value should serve as a fair 
estimate of the actual market value of the property. If it does not, then the 
amount demanded as taxes is also incorrect. 
46 The 114 files examined were 5.04% of the total files, so multiplying the values 
determined in the random sample by the inverse of .0504—19.84—will give an 
approximation of the size of the data element within the entire sample set. See 
Estimating the Population Mean Using a Random Sample (Sept. 8, 2003), 
http://www.stat.wmich.edu/s216/book/node75.html [https://perma.cc/B4VW-
5ZM5]. 
47 Utilizing the formulae in Estimating the Population, the standard error figures 
calculated for these two approximations are $760 and $29,375 respectively. The 
standard error measures the chances that the estimate is incorrect because only a 
random sample was used. It is calculated by dividing how internally consistent 
the data in the sample was (the standard deviation of the data) by the sampling 
size used to create the data set. See id. If the data set has little internal variation, 
its standard deviation will be low leading to a small estimated error. Likewise, a 
larger sample size will decrease the chance of error as the data used is more 
likely to be typical of the data within the data set. 
48 Almost twenty-two percent of the cases in the Foreclosure Data were not 
resolved at the time the study was concluded (February 17, 2017). See 
Foreclosure Data, supra note 7. The rest of the cases were resolved by the 
municipality withdrawing the complaint—usually an indication that the 
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that did foreclose was $57,963,000. These properties were taken to pay 
an outstanding tax liability of $1,352,000, a difference of $56,611,000 
in excess recovery for the towns in the year. 
To summarize, based on an examination of a typical year, the data 
show that Massachusetts municipalities are receiving almost $43.00 
for each dollar owed by taking tax title to recover delinquent taxes. It 
is no wonder why taking tax title is the remedy of choice. 
Unfortunately, it is a remedy that fails to pass constitutional muster for 
two reasons as the next section discusses. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES 
There are two major constitutional problems with the 
Massachusetts tax deed under Section 53.49 First, the procedure results 
in the municipalities taking far more of the taxpayers’ property than is 
necessary to pay the debt owed, resulting in a taking of property 
without just compensation. Second, the procedure fails to satisfy 
procedural due process because a hearing is not provided on a timely 
basis. Each problem is discussed in turn. 
A. By Keeping More Than Is Owed, a Tax Deed Takes the 
Property of the Taxpayer Without Providing Adequate 
Compensation 
1. As a Violation of the Federal Constitution 
The Supreme Court has only directly visited the issue of a 
government entity keeping the excess proceeds from a tax seizure 
twice.50 The first case, United States v. Lawton, was decided in 1884.51 
In Lawton, the United States “purchased” land being sold for a tax 
                                                                                                                                            
delinquent taxes and collection expenses had been paid or the matter has 
otherwise been settled. 
49 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60, § 53 (2012). 
50 The issue was also indirectly referenced in Chapman v. Zobelein. See Chapman 
v. Zobelein, 237 U.S. 135 (1915). There, the taking issue was not presented to 
the Court as the plaintiff was seeking to have a conveyance to a third party 
cancelled eight years after tax title was taken and more than three years after the 
title was conveyed to the defendant. See id. at 137-38. Chapman, therefore, was 
not a challenge to the taking by the state, it was a challenge to the subsequent 
disposal of the property by the state. See id. at 139 (“this is a bill attacking the 
title of the purchaser who bought at the second sale . . . .”). Whatever rights the 
plaintiff had to the surplus property had been surrendered by his failure to use 
the procedures provided to him by California law. See id. at 137-38. 
51 United States v. Lawton, 110 U.S. 146 (1884). 
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deficiency for a stated value of $1,100.00 even though the taxpayer 
only owed $170.50 in taxes and associated costs.52 The taxpayer’s 
estate demanded the surplus, but the government refused – Lawton 
clearly establishes that such retention is inappropriate: 
To withhold the surplus from the owner would be to 
violate the [F]ifth [A]mendment to the [C]onstitution, 
and deprive him of his property without due process of 
law or take his property for public use without just 
compensation. If he affirms the propriety of selling or 
taking more than enough of his land to pay the tax and 
penalty and interest and costs, and applies for the 
surplus money, he must receive at least that.53 
The issue was revisited in Nelson v. City of New York.54 As in 
Lawton, a government entity, this time the City of New York, took two 
parcels of real estate that had far more value than the amounts owed.55 
The taxpayer defaulted on both seizures and was denied any of the 
excess proceeds obtained.56 The Supreme Court upheld the 
government’s right to keep the proceeds, but in a manner that did not 
contradict the holding in Lawton: 
[W]e do not have here a statute which absolutely 
precludes an owner from obtaining the surplus 
proceeds of a judicial sale. In City of New York v. 
Chapman Docks Co., 149 N.Y.S.2d 679 (App. Div. 
1956), an owner filed a timely answer in a foreclosure 
proceeding, asserting his property had a value 
substantially exceeding the tax due. The Appellate 
Division construed . . . the statute to mean that upon 
proof of this allegation a separate sale should be 
directed so that the owner might receive the surplus.57 
Nelson recognizes, therefore, that a taxpayer can procedurally 
waive a claim to the excess valuation as long as—and this is a critical 
                                                            
52 See id. at 149. The U.S. did not pay the purchase price; instead, it kept the land 
at the $1,100.00 value. Id. 
53 Id. at 150. 
54 Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103 (1956). 
55 See id. at 105-06 (finding one parcel valued at $6,000 was taken for a $65.00 
charge; another parcel valued at $46,000 was taken for a $814.50 charge). 
56 See id. 
57 Id. at 110 (footnote omitted). 
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requirement—such a claim can be made at some point in the 
proceedings. Consequently, both Lawton and Nelson stand for the 
proposition that any surplus property taken must be returned to the 
taxpayer upon an appropriately made demand. 
Nelson was decided in 1956.58 Although there has not been 
additional litigation in this area in the Supreme Court,59 Lawton and 
Nelson have been considered more recently in a few lower federal 
court and state court decisions. An examination of two of the federal 
cases will highlight the debate that has recently developed about the 
meaning of Lawton and Nelson and will show the continuing viability 
of the doctrine announced in Lawton.60 
A few years ago, the district court in D.C. agreed with the 
interpretation of Lawton and Nelson and found the holdings consistent, 
continuing the viability of Lawton. The district court stated in 
Coleman: 
This Court draws two clear principles from the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Lawton and Nelson. 
Nelson makes clear that a Takings Clause violation 
regarding the retention of equity will not arise when a 
                                                            
58 See id. at 103. 
59 The only Supreme Court case that cites to Nelson is Mennonite Board of 
Missions, which addressed providing notice of a foreclosure, not the distribution 
of excess proceeds from one. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 
791, 799 (1983). Lawton has not been cited by the Supreme Court since the 
Nelson decision. 
60 A detailed discussion of the state cases does not add to the discussion as the 
differences in interpretation are adequately presented by the two federal district 
court opinions. The principal state cases that require the excess to be available to 
the taxpayer include: Bogie v. Town of Barnet, 270 A.2d 898, 903 (Vt. 1970); 
City of Anchorage v. Thomas, 624 P.2d 271, 274 (Alaska 1981); & Thomas 
Tool Servs., Inc. v. Town of Croydon, 761 A.2d 439, 441 (N.H. 2000) 
(discussing the state constitution). The state cases not finding such a requirement 
include: City of Auburn v. Mandarelli, 320 A.2d 22, 32 (Me. 1974) & Ritter v. 
Ross, 558 N.W.2d 909, 910 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996). Another federal case is 
Balthazar v. Mari Limited, 301 F. Supp. 103, 105 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff’d per 
curiam, 396 U.S. 114 (1969) (finding no due process problem as excess was 
available to taxpayer). 
  The Supreme Judicial Court has considered the statute that is the subject of 
this article. See Kelly v. City of Boston, 204 N.E.2d 123 (Mass. 1965). The SJC 
determined that the statute reserves the excess value from the tax taking to the 
municipality. See id. at 125. Apparently, no constitutional challenge was raised 
by the parties to the statute and the SJC made no constitutional ruling in the 
case. See id. at 123–26. 
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tax-sale statute provides an avenue for recovery of the 
surplus equity. Lawton makes clear that a Takings 
Clause violation will arise when a tax-sale statute 
grants a former owner an independent property interest 
in the surplus equity and the government fails to return 
that surplus. The question [the current] case presents 
is: What if the tax-sale statute does not provide a right 
to the surplus and the statute provides no avenue for 
recovery of any surplus? A property interest in equity 
could conceivably be created by some other legal 
source. In that circumstance, failure to provide an 
avenue for recovery of the equity would appear to 
produce a result identical to Lawton: Property to which 
an individual is legally entitled has been taken without 
recourse.61 
In summary, the Coleman court recognized that once a state 
recognizes a property interest in the taxpayer, it cannot summarily 
remove that interest. Under this logic, a Massachusetts delinquent 
taxpayer has a full ownership interest in the land before the tax deed is 
used, so making that interest simply disappear deprives the taxpayer of 
that interest, which Lawton prohibits.62 
The view that Lawton has continuing viability is not unanimous as 
the District of Oregon found the opposite in Reinmiller v. Marion 
                                                            
61 Coleman v. D.C., 70 F. Supp. 3d 58, 80 (D.D.C. 2014) (footnote and citations 
omitted). 
62 Cf. Langlois v. Langlois, 93 N.E.2d 264, 265 (Mass. 1950) (finding that 
limitations on the use of the financial value of a property was inconsistent with 
holding fee simple in it). For the analysis of a taking, the property owner’s entire 
interest is considered. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978) (“‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single 
parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a 
particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a 
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses . . . on 
the . . . parcel as a whole . . . .”); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326–27 (2002) (same); Concrete Pipe & Prods. 
v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993) (“[A] claimant’s 
parcel of property [sh]ould not first be divided into what was taken and what 
was left for the purpose of demonstrating the taking of the former to be complete 
and hence compensable. To the extent that any portion of property is taken, that 
portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is whether 
the property taken is all, or only a portion of, the parcel in question.”). 
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Cty.63 When the decision is examined, however, its weakness becomes 
apparent. According to the Reinmiller court, a state is apparently free 
to impose any system of taxation it wishes.64 Even if you accept the 
court’s statement that the “States have a very wide discretion”65 to 
design its system of taxation, this cannot imply that such systems are 
free from constitutional scrutiny.66 As a farfetched example, could a 
state only tax a racial or religious minority on the basis of membership 
in that group?67 If, as is clearly the case in this example, the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the 
structure and functioning of a taxing system, its Due Process Clause 
must likewise apply. 
After indicating that constitutional limits might not be relevant in 
any case, Reinmiller nevertheless limited Nelson to only requiring 
                                                            
63 See Reinmiller v. Marion Cty., No. 05-1926-PK, 2006 WL 2987707 (D. Or. Oct. 
16, 2006). 
64 See Reinmiller, 2006 WL 2987707, at *3 (analyzing the validity of the due 
process claim being made with the statement, “The law is well-settled that ‘[t]he 
States have a very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes.’” Weissinger v. 
White, 733 F.2d 802, 805–06 (11th Cir. 1984), quoting Allied Stores v. Bowers, 
358 U.S. 522, 526 (1959)). Of course, the Weissinger case relied upon by 
Reinmiller continued, “To protect the states’ fundamental taxing authority, 
federal equal protection challenges to state tax laws are reviewed with a 
minimal level of scrutiny.” Weissinger, 733 F.2d at 806 (emphasis added). The 
case before the court in Reinmiller was not an equal protection claim. 
65 Reinmiller, 2006 WL 2987707, at *3 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
66 See id. (“Federal courts have not been willing to disturb state tax laws and find 
constitutional violations.”). The Reinmiller Court ultimately dismissed the action 
“with prejudice.” Id. at *4. Reinmiller may have been correct that, as a matter of 
comity, the federal courts will not review the constitutionality of a state taxation 
statute, particularly on equal protections grounds, but significantly, this imposes 
no limitation of the evaluation of constitutionality in the state court, a process 
that must be available for the abstention to apply. See Fair Assessment in Real 
Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981) (“we hold that taxpayers are 
barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the 
validity of state tax systems in federal courts. Such taxpayers must seek 
protection of their federal rights by state remedies, provided of course that those 
remedies are plain, adequate, and complete, and may ultimately seek review of 
the state decisions in this Court.” (emphasis added)). The Reinmiller Court may 
have been right to dismiss the case as it belonged in state court under an 
abstention doctrine, but it completely lacked the authority to deny the plaintiff 
an opportunity to have a state court review the constitutionality of the provision 
as its dismissal with prejudice attempts to do. See Levin v. Commerce Energy, 
560 U.S. 413, 421–22 (2010) (discussing comity). 
67 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
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procedural due process.68 To support this, the Reinmiller court quoted 
a final part of the Nelson discussion of the substantive issue, 
specifically “nothing in the Federal Constitution prevents this where 
the record shows adequate steps were taken to notify the owners of the 
charges due and the foreclosure proceedings.”69 However, the 
highlighted “this” in the quoted sentence from Nelson, refers to the 
previous sentence of the opinion which qualified the reason that no 
constitutional violation had been found by using the clause, “in the 
absence of timely action to redeem or to recovery any surplus . . . .”70 
Therefore, Nelson says that the procedural due process that was 
provided was adequate specifically because the taxpayer had failed to 
seek a recovery of the surplus through the method that was provided 
by the law.71 Consequently, this does not mean that the constitutional 
requirements found in Lawton no longer existed or that a state needs to 
provide no more than procedural due process. 
Finally, the Reinmiller Court attempted to dismiss the Lawton 
constitutional holding as being dicta in a purely statutory construction 
case.72 This is simply not true. The Supreme Court was using an 
argumentum ad absurdum to construe the Lawton statute.73 The 
absurdity it established was that the alternate interpretation proposed 
for the statute – the taxpayer is not entitled to the surplus – would 
cause the statute to be unconstitutional.74 Thus, the argument’s 
substance on constitutionality was not only necessary for the decision, 
it was critical as without the argument, the Court would not have been 
able to construe the statute at bar. The argument is holding, not dicta.75 
Of the two district court cases on point, therefore, only Coleman, is 
sound. As Coleman recognized, the constitutional limitation created by 
Lawton retains viability. This conclusion is reinforced by the Supreme 
                                                            
68 See Reinmiller, 2006 WL 2987707, at *3. 
69 Id. (quoting Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103, 110 (1956)) (emphasis 
added). 
70 Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103, 110 (1956). 
71 See id. 
72 See Reinmiller, 2006 WL 2987707, at *3. 
73 See United States v. Lawton, 110 U.S. 146, 150 (1884). 
74 See id. 
75 See Obiter Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (“[a] judicial 
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary 
to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential.”); see generally 
Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 
(2005). 
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Court’s most recent discussion of takings in 2017, Nelson v. 
Colorado.76 
Colorado is not a tax foreclosure case; instead, it addresses 
whether a state is required to refund money collected pursuant to a 
criminal conviction if that conviction is later permanently overturned 
on appeal.77 In one of the two consolidated cases, the defendant had 
been convicted, was fined over $8,000.00, saw the conviction 
overturned on appeal, and was ultimately acquitted in the subsequent 
retrial.78 In the other case, the fine was over $4,000.00, the convictions 
were also struck down, and the state elected not to retry the defendant 
after appeal.79 In both cases, despite having been judicially exonerated, 
the state refused to return all of the money that had been paid by or 
collected from the defendants to pay the fines and associated court 
costs.80 
The Supreme Court used the three-part Mathews v. Eldridge81 due 
process test to require the state to refund the full amount collected.82 
As described by the Court in Colorado, the three parts are, “(A) the 
private interest affected; (B) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that 
interest through the procedures used; and (C) the governmental interest 
at stake.”83 Consequently, each of these factors will be briefly 
described and then compared to the Massachusetts tax deed procedures 
in dealing with the failure to return the excess value of the property 
seized to the taxpayer. 
For the first factor – the private interest affected – the Court stated, 
“[the state] may not retain funds taken from [the defendants] solely 
because of their now-invalidated convictions, for [the state] may not 
presume a person, adjudged guilty of no crime, nonetheless guilty 
enough for monetary exactions.”84 Thus, and similar to the excess 
proceeds kept following the use of a Massachusetts tax deed, the 
government had no articulable title to the money taken after the 
                                                            
76 See Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017). 
77 See id. at 1252. 
78 See id. at 1252–53. 
79 See id. at 1253. 
80 See id. at 1253–54. One defendant was denied any refund; the other was only 
given a partial refund. See id. 
81 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
82 See Colorado, 137 Sup. Ct. at 1252. 
83 Id. at 1255. 
84 See id. at 1256. 
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convictions were voided in Colorado and has no claim to the excess 
property seized from the delinquent taxpayer here. For tax deeds, this 
first factor weighs against constitutionality. 
For the second factor – the risk of erroneous deprivation – the risk 
is higher for a tax deed taking than it was for the two exonerated 
criminal defendants. The defendants in Colorado could obtain the 
return of their property, but were subject to a high evidentiary burden 
to do so.85 Requiring any trial, much less one with a high burden of 
proof, raised too great of a risk of an incorrect result as the defendants 
were presumed innocent.86 Further, the Court noted that one 
exonerated from a misdemeanor charge had no remedy as Colorado 
law did not allow them to claim a refund.87 The Massachusetts tax 
deed procedure for returning the excess property to the taxpayer is as 
extreme as Colorado’s treatment of misdemeanors as no recovery is 
available. There is a 100% chance that the taxpayer’s property will not 
be returned.88 Again, for tax deeds, this factor weighs against 
constitutionality. 
For the final factor – the government interest at stake – an easier 
evaluation occurred as the Colorado Court could find no such 
interest.89 This analysis applies with equal force to the Massachusetts 
tax deed process as a municipality has no interest in the money beyond 
that necessary to pay the taxes owed with the associated costs of 
collection. Once again, the statute is unsustainable. 
Consequently, although Colorado derives from criminal cases, its 
analysis of due process teaches much about the Massachusetts statute 
allowing municipalities to appropriate the excess valuation following a 
tax deed seizure. It shows that all three of the Mathews v. Eldridge 
factors disfavor the tax deed procedure. This leads directly to the 
conclusion that tax deeds violate the Due Process Clause. 
Whether the analysis is performed under Lawton or Colorado, the 
result is the same. A municipality that does not return the excess 
                                                            
85 See id. (requiring the defendant to prove innocence based on clear and 
convincing evidence). 
86 See id. at 1257. 
87 See id. The Court also took note of the costs of litigation as a factor standing 
against the state’s position. See id. 
88 See supra text accompanying notes 46-48. 
89 See Colorado, 137 Sup. Ct. at 1257 (“Colorado has no interest in withholding 
from Nelson and Madden money to which the State currently has zero claim of 
right.”). 
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property to the taxpayer engages in a taking in violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
2. As a Violation of the Massachusetts Constitution 
The Massachusetts Constitution has its own provisions that 
guarantee due process: Articles 1, 10, and 12 of the Declaration of 
Rights and Part II, ch. 1 of the Constitution.90 The analysis under the 
Massachusetts Constitution starts with the same analysis that is 
presented elsewhere in this article, as a violation of the federal due 
process clause would also constitute a violation of the state 
constitutional right.91 Consequently, the Massachusetts tax deed would 
violate both procedural and substantive due process as discussed.92 It 
is important to recognize, however, the federal right is the minimum 
protection provided.93 The Massachusetts due process right can go 
farther; indeed, for taxation, it does. 
A well-established requirement of the Massachusetts Constitution 
is a requirement of taxation equality. “[The Massachusetts Due 
Process Right] forbid[s] the imposition upon one taxpayer of a burden 
relatively greater or relatively less than that imposed upon other 
taxpayers.”94 Requiring a delinquent taxpayer to surrender all of the 
value of the taxpayer’s real estate would appear to do this. Unlike 
“regular” taxpayers, the delinquent ones would be required to pay a tax 
many times higher than all others in the municipality. Based on the 
averages found in the empirical study reported above, rather than 
paying $4,177 as others would, the delinquent taxpayer would pay 
$258,462, an amount almost sixty-two times higher.95 
                                                            
90  See, e.g., Moe v. Sec’y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Mass. 1981); 
Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592, 601 n.8 (Mass. 1971). 
91  See, e.g., Lowell Gas Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Util., 84 N.E.2d 811, 816 (Mass. 
1949) (“The Constitution of this Commonwealth contains safeguards against 
deprivation of property without due process of law at least as strong as those of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
92  See infra Section IV.B (discussing procedural due process violations); see supra 
Section IV.A.1 (discussing substantive due process violations). 
93  See Lowell Gas, 84 N.E.2d at 816. 
94  In re Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.E.2d 795, 800 (Mass. 1955); accord 
Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 178 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Mass. 1961) (applying 
Opinion of the Justices). 
95  See Foreclosure Data, supra note 7 at C3 & D3. 
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The SJC has been very strict in its interpretation of this provision. 
For example, the SJC disapproved a proposal to allow the towns to use 
estimated rather than actual tax bills.96 As the court stated: 
Under the proposed [section] the estimated tax bill is to 
be precisely the amount of one fourth of the tax 
assessed the preceding year under § 57. There is to be 
no new assessment. In consequence, no attention is to 
be given to changes in valuation during the preceding 
year. This means that the destruction of buildings or the 
erection of new ones prior to January 1 of the current 
year cannot be taken into account. Assessments of less, 
or more, than 100% of full fair cash value in some 
cases necessarily would be the basis upon which the 
taxes would be computed. The estimated taxes, which 
would not be proportional, would violate Part II, ch. 1, 
§ 1, art. 4, of the Constitution of the Commonwealth 
which empowers the General Court “to impose and 
levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates 
and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and persons 
resident, and estates lying, within the said 
Commonwealth.”97 
Similarly, the court ruled against an exemption of $5,000 that was 
to be given to owner-occupiers of residential property as an income tax 
credit.98 According to the court, this provision would violate taxation 
equality as someone who rented the real estate would not receive it, 
thus establishing a difference.99 
If a $5,000 tax exemption is sufficient to trigger a tax equality 
problem—an amount that would only change someone’s tax by 
$255100—a difference of several hundred thousand dollars must 
likewise be problematic. Massachusetts tax deeds violate the state 
constitutional requisite of tax equality. 
                                                            
96  Opinion of the Justices, 249 N.E.2d 23 (Mass. 1969). 
97  Id. at 24 (citation omitted). 
98  Opinion of the Justices, 181 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1962). 
99  See id. at 795. 
100  Massachusetts current income tax rate is 5.1%; 5.1% of $5,000 is $255. 
 2017 Personal Income Tax Changes, MASS.GOV, 
https://www.mass.gov/guides/2017-personal-income-tax-changes (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/CG2P-5AN6]. 
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B. Procedural Due Process and the Tax Deed 
1. Normally, a Hearing Must Be Provided Before Property Is 
Taken 
It is axiomatic that state “deprivation[s] of . . . property by 
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing . . . 
.”101 As the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held, a deprivation of 
property requires its owner to be given “some kind of notice and 
afforded some kind of hearing.”102 Almost always, the notice and 
hearing must precede the deprivation,103 but there are two recognized 
exceptions. First, if “the potential length or severity of the deprivation 
does not indicate a likelihood of serious loss and . . . the procedures 
underlying the decision to act are sufficiently reliable to minimize the 
risk of erroneous determination, government may act without 
providing additional advance procedural safeguards.”104 Second, the 
existence of “an exigent circumstance permit[s] postponing any notice 
or hearing until after the [taking] is effected.”105 
When the Massachusetts statutory procedure using tax deeds is 
examined under these standards, it fails. Although the pre-seizure 
notice provided to the taxpayer seems adequate,106 there is no hearing 
                                                            
101  Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (emphasis 
added). 
102  Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975); see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 
67, 83-84 (1972); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127-28 (1990); Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. 
Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978). 
103  Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313. 
104  Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
105  Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 16 (1991). 
106  The notice requirements of the Due Process Clause appear to be satisfied by the 
tax deed process. Before the property can be taken by tax deed, the tax collector 
must give notice to the taxpayer by individualized service as would be done for 
the service of a witness subpoena. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60, § 53 (2012). 
This requires service in hand, by exposition, or by abode. MASS. R. CIV. P. 
45(c). Additionally, section 53 requires that the notice of intent to take the 
property be posted in two public places. See § 53. 
  If the taxes remain unpaid fourteen days after the notice is given, the deed 
taking title can be recorded. See § 53. If an action to foreclose the redemption 
period is brought, the normal rules for commencing a civil action in 
Massachusetts are followed. See MASS. R. CIV. P. 4. All of this is reasonably 
designed to give actual notice to an interested party where his or her identity and 
location are known and to provide generalized notice to others who are either 
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provided before the property is taken (nor immediately afterwards). As 
neither of the two recognized exceptions to a pre-seizure hearing 
applies, Massachusetts tax deeds cause a procedural due process 
violation. 
Under Section 53, the town’s tax collector can “take such land” 
after providing notice, but without a hearing.107 No pre-taking hearing 
is required or even available.108 This leaves the taxpayer without title 
to his or her property for a substantial period of time.109 As the 
Supreme Court held in Mullane, however, a hearing must, in general, 
occur before the taking.110 Thus, the basic requirement of the Due 
Process Clause that a property owner be given a hearing before that 
property is taken has failed.111 Consequently, unless one or both of the 
two exceptions that allow a hearing to occur after the seizure are 
satisfied, the Massachusetts tax deed process fails constitutional 
muster. 
                                                                                                                                            
unknown or known without location. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 
462 U.S. 791 (1983). 
107  See § 53. 
108  See id. Apparently, no taxpayer has challenged the lack of a pre-seizure hearing 
in Land Court. See Interview with Deborah J. Patterson, supra note 41. Most 
taxpayers assert their redemption rights as pro se litigants. See id.; see also 
Foreclosure Data, supra note 7 (showing 6.1% of taxpayers represented by 
attorneys). As such, they may be unaware of the larger constitutional problem. 
109  See infra Part II. The empirical study that was done as part of this article was 
concluded on February 17, 2017. It examined data from files opened between 
August 1, 2013 and July 31, 2014. For the majority of these files (78.1%), it 
took the court just over a year on average (398 days) to conclude the case. Of 
course, 21.9% of the files were still unresolved in February of 2017. For these 
files, the taxpayer’s title was appropriated for a period of at least 2.5 to 3.5 
years. None of these times include the period from when the tax deed was 
executed and recorded to the time of filing of the foreclosure suit. It seems fair 
to conclude from the data that the average taxpayer against whom a tax deed is 
executed loses title to the property for at least a year and a half. See Foreclosure 
Data, supra note 7. 
110  Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
111  Importantly, no post-seizure hearing is provided by the statute unless the 
municipality decides to foreclose the taxpayer’s right of redemption or unless 
the taxpayer brings a suit in equity to recover the property taken from him. 
Massachusetts’s equity jurisdiction is somewhat guarded but seems broad 
enough to include this kind of claim, for example in Bernbaum v. Town of 
Nantucket, 646 N.E.2d 739, 740 (Mass. 1995), particularly where constitutional 
rights are invoked. See Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 178 N.E.2d 10, 17 
(Mass. 1961). 
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2. Exception One Fails: Weighing the Seriousness of the 
Deprivation and Likelihood of Mistake 
The first exception has two parts. The necessity of a pre-seizure 
hearing is excused where the deprivation is not likely to be serious and 
the pre-seizure decision-making is reliable and unlikely to be 
erroneous.112 The Court’s use of the conjunction “and” indicates that 
both requisites must be met.113 For Massachusetts tax deeds, neither is. 
i. First Infirmity: Taking Title from the Taxpayer Is a 
Serious Deprivation of Property Rights 
The “seriousness” of the loss created by Section 53 is enormous. 
The tax collector is not taking some form of security in the taxpayer’s 
property; instead, title is taken.114 After the tax deed is executed and 
recorded, the municipality owns the real estate, subject only to a right 
of redemption that provides the possibility that the taxpayer can 
reclaim title in the future.115 Most aspects of property ownership 
transfer to the municipality immediately, including the rights of 
possession and profit.116 Under Section 53, a taxpayer can be notified 
of a claimed deficiency, and fourteen days later be disposed of almost 
all aspects of title and possession except a limited right of redemption. 
All of this would be done without a hearing. Upon petition, the 
taxpayer can be put back into possession of the property,117 but still 
would not have title to the real estate. Further, the taxpayer could have 
the right of possession blocked for a significant period of time as the 
                                                            
112  See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978). 
113  See id.; see also Gallagher v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 305 F.3d 264, 270 
(4th Cir. 2002) (finding that “each and every” meant “all”); McCormick v. Dep’t 
of A. F., 307 F.3d 1339, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (construing “or” to mean 
alternatives). 
114  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60, § 54 (2012) (“Title to the land so taken shall 
thereupon vest in the town, subject to the right of redemption.”) (emphasis 
added); West v. Bd. of Selectmen of Yarmouth, 188 N.E.2d 473, 474 (Mass. 
1963) (recognizing that title was taken by tax collector). 
115  See § 54. 
116  See id. § 53 (“[T]he collector of taxes . . . may, in the name and on behalf of said 
city or town, take immediate possession of such land and, until the tax title so 
acquired is redeemed, collect the rent and other income from such land . . . .”). 
117  See id. (“Upon petition of any person having a right to redeem such tax title, the 
superior court for the county within which the land lies, if it adjudges justice and 
the circumstances so warrant, may, upon such terms as it shall deem equitable, 
enjoin a taking of possession under this section or command the surrender of a 
possession taken.”). 
2018 The Unconstitutionality of the Tax Deed 297 
petition action is heard by the Superior Court.118 If rental income that 
is owed to the taxpayer from the land is not collected, or if the 
municipality causes any kind of injury to the property while it is in its 
possession, the taxpayer has no remedy.119 
In summary, a taxpayer could find title and possession gone, and 
the property destroyed, all based on a tax delinquency that is claimed 
but not established. The extent of the deprivation, particularly with the 
almost sacred regard given real estate title,120 is clearly “serious.”121 
ii. Second Infirmity: There Are Significant Chances of 
Mistakes (or Worse) Being Made in the Process 
Evaluating the possibility of mistake has to start with the fact that 
the system is run separately in each municipality in Massachusetts, 
each of which has its own capabilities and operating characteristics.122 
Each municipality is responsible for the hiring, training and 
                                                            
118  See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1978) 
(holding that the deprivation of utility services without a pre-termination hearing 
violates due process). 
119  See § 53. (“Neither said city or town nor any of its officers, agents or employees 
shall be liable or accountable to the owner or to any other person having an 
interest in such land for failure to collect rent or other income therefrom; and 
neither said city or town nor any of its officers, agents or employees shall be 
liable for injury or damage caused by the possession of land under the section to 
such land or to the person or property of any person.”). 
120  See Equator Mining & Smelting Co. v. Hall, 106 U.S. 86, 87 (1882) (describing 
real estate title as “important” and “almost . . . sacred”). 
121  See Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 19. 
122  There are 351 municipalities in Massachusetts, thirty-nine cities and 312 towns. 
Information and Historical Data on Cities, Towns and Counties in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SEC’Y OF THE COMMW. OF MASS., 
https://www.sec.state.ma.us/cis/cisctlist/ctlistidx.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/2HZE-932A]. The smallest community by population is 
Gosnold; the largest, not surprisingly, is Boston. See id. According to the 2010 
census, Gosnold has seventy-five residents and Boston has 617,594. Id. Despite 
its small size and limited amount of land, Gosnold has its own tax collector. 
Telephone Interview with Lisa Wright, Town Clerk, Town of Gosnold (June 26, 
2017). The current Gosnold Collector is a part-time employee of the Town. Id. 
The scale of Boston’s tax collection apparatus is considerably larger. The 
collection department for Boston has twenty-eight employees listed as of 2015. 
See Employee Earnings Report 2015, ANALYZE BOSTON, 
https://data.boston.gov/dataset/employee-earnings-report/resource/2ff6343f-
850d-46e7-98d1-aca79b619fd6 (last updated Jan. 11, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/9ZFL-2C6W]. 
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supervision of its tax collector.123 This aggravates several areas of 
potential mistake in the system. 
First, state law imposes no minimum standards for the individuals 
chosen by the municipality as its tax collector, and requires no training 
before the individual assumes the tax collector’s office.124 Clearly, 
there are no assurances in this process. This is particularly true in the 
many smaller communities in Massachusetts, where the individual 
employed may not have any experience or background in 
Massachusetts real estate tax law, or even in basic accounting or 
governmental operations.125 With unsupervised municipal employment 
being used, it is probable that at least a few of the 351 tax collectors in 
Massachusetts lack the skills needed to perform the job without 
error.126 Therefore, the lack of minimum job qualifications constitutes 
the first source of mistake introduced into the due process analysis. 
Second, the continuing supervision of the tax collectors as they do 
their jobs in the 351 communities is also problematic. The power 
granted by the statute to execute and record a tax deed is given to the 
tax collector directly.127 The tax collector needs no approval from any 
other municipal officer or board before executing and recording a tax 
deed. Further, no municipal entity has the authority under the statute to 
reverse or modify the decision of the collector.128 Under the statutory 
tax deed scheme, the tax collector operates without direct supervision 
when a tax deed is created and used. Whether a mistake happens 
because of inexperience found in a smaller town,129 or results from the 
                                                            
123  See § 2. In Gosnold, the Tax Collector works with the Town’s Manager. See 
Telephone Interview with Lisa Wright, supra note 122. In Boston, the data 
reveal a typical government bureaucracy based on the job titles in the database. 
See Employee Earnings Report 2015, supra note 122. 
124  See § 2. 
125  In Gosnold, the elected Treasurer was also appointed Tax Collector. Telephone 
Interview with Lisa Wright, supra note 122. She is paid as a part-time employee 
in the role. Id. Professionally, she is a teacher on Martha’s Vineyard. Id. 
126  There have been challenges raised in the Land Court to a tax deed redemption 
foreclosure on the grounds of a mistake made in the calculation of the tax owed. 
Interview with Deborah J. Patterson, supra note 41. 
127  See § 53 (“[T]he collector may take such land for the town . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
128  See id. Similarly, no judicial entity has the express power to undue a tax deed. 
129  In Gosnold, for example, the part-time Tax Collector has not had any experience 
with tax deeds. See Telephone Interview with Lisa Wright, supra note 122 
(indicating that the Town of Gosnold has not executed a tax deed for at least 
fifteen years). If Gosnold now needs to collect a real estate tax debt, the Tax 
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inflexibility found in the entrenched bureaucracy that comprises a 
major municipality’s tax collection operation,130 significant errors are 
likely. Even the software used may be untrustworthy.131 
Third, employee fraud does occur at the municipal level both 
within and without the tax collection department.132 Equally, tax 
collectors soliciting bribes or engaging in other misconduct to affect a 
taxpayer’s taxes has occurred.133 Consequently, although apparently 
fairly rare, tax collector criminal malfeasance is another source of 
potential error. 
In summary, the process of collecting taxes on the thousands of 
real estate parcels in arrears within the Commonwealth is a 
complicated enough bureaucratic activity that occasional problems 
will occur. These problems could be as simple as the tax collector’s 
                                                                                                                                            
Collector would be entering territory that has not been explored by anyone in the 
Town in a decade and a half. 
130  It seems highly unlikely that Boston’s Tax Collector drafts tax deeds; instead, 
the bureaucracy that reports to the Collector is likely to draft the documents in 
the ordinary course of business of the department and present them to the 
Collector for signature. 
131  See Lauren Feiner, Over 2,000 Massachusetts Taxpayers Billed Incorrectly Due 




132  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Canon, 368 N.E.2d 1181, 1182 (Mass. 1977); see 
also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268A, §§ 2–3, 17–21B (2012); see generally Brian 
C. Mooney, Probe Targets Excise Collection, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 1995, at 
(Metro) 1,1995 WLNR 2136957 (“One reason is that deputies—often appointed 
by local tax collectors on the basis of personal, political or family connections—
surface with embarrassing regularity in embezzlement, tax or other corruption 
cases.”); Ex-tax Collector to Forfeit Funds, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Nov. 30, 2017, 
at 3 (reporting restitution after tax collector embezzlement). 
133  See Finnegan v. United States, 204 F.2d 105, 108 (8th Cir. 1953) (upholding 
conviction for conflict of interest where an IRS collector represented a taxpayer 
before the agency); Commonwealth v. Goldbard, 419 A.2d 161, 162-64 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1980) (upholding conviction for bribery where a tax collector 
solicited a bribe so that taxpayer would not have to pay tax). Cf. Coleman v. 
State ex rel. Mitchell, 182 So. 627, 629 (Fla. 1938) (finding that a deputy tax 
collector could not be convicted of soliciting a bribe under the Florida statute as 
the statute did not include deputy tax collectors). See generally MacLean v. 
Delinsky, 556 N.E.2d 60, 61-63 (Mass. 1990) (describing some of the factual 
background of the Barczak matter); Businessmen Say Barczak Acted on Own, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20, 1983 (reporting on a scheme by a Massachusetts 
revenue officer to solicit bribes so that a business’s tax problems could be 
resolved for significantly less money than was owed). 
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office crediting a received payment to the wrong property to as 
complex as a criminal scheme to enrich a member of the tax 
collector’s office. Of course, with 351 separately operated tax 
collection operations, the risk of error multiplies because of the 
operational inexperience introduced, particularly in the smaller towns. 
In any case, the pre-seizure decision-making is not completely 
reliable.134 
This is particularly true with tax deeds because the law has no 
option for the taxpayer to challenge the determination that taxes are 
owed before title to the property is removed. If a tax collector demands 
a payment that the taxpayer asserts is not owed, the taxpayer has no 
way to challenge the order. If the demand is not met, the real estate is 
taken; if it is met, the taxpayer’s money is taken. Either way, the 
taxpayer is deprived of his or her property without due process. 
3. Exception Two Fails: No Exigent Circumstances Require 
Action Before a Hearing 
In the early 1990s, the Supreme Court decided Connecticut v. 
Doehr.135 The case reviewed the prejudgment attachment procedure 
authorized by Connecticut law in civil suits that allowed a security 
interest to be obtained against the real estate of a defendant without 
requiring pre-seizure notice and a judicial hearing.136 The court, in 
striking down the Connecticut provision, held that: 
[p]ermitting a court to authorize attachment merely 
because the plaintiff believes the defendant is liable, or 
because the plaintiff can make out a facially valid 
complaint, would permit the deprivation of the 
defendant’s property when the claim would fail to 
convince [the ultimate fact-finder], when it rested on 
factual allegations that were sufficient to state a cause 
of action but which the defendant would dispute, or in 
the case of a mere good-faith standard, even when the 
                                                            
134  See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978). 
135  Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991). 
136  See id. at 4. The original plaintiff in the Connecticut state suit in Doehr was 
John F. DiGiovanni who had obtained a pre-trial, ex parte attachment of the 
defendant, Brian K. Doehr’s home in Meriden, Connecticut. See id. at 5. 
DiGiovanni obtained the attachment as part of his suit against Doehr seeking 
recovery for an alleged assault and battery. See id. Doehr brought an 
independent suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the 
attachment process. See id. at 7. 
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complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. The potential for unwarranted 
attachment in these situations is self-evident and too 
great to satisfy the requirements of due process absent 
any countervailing consideration.137 
As the Connecticut attachment process struck down in Doehr has 
many similarities to the procedure authorized by Massachusetts tax 
deeds, the case instructs well on the inappropriateness of the tax deed 
process that does not require a hearing and makes no showing of a 
“countervailing consideration” of exigent circumstances to justify its 
lack.138 
Under the Connecticut procedures in Doehr, a prejudgment real 
estate attachment could be obtained by the plaintiff based on an 
affidavit submitted to a judge for review.139 The judge was to evaluate 
the affidavit to determine if there was “probable cause to sustain the 
validity of the plaintiff’s claims . . . .”140 The defendant was not given 
notice that the plaintiff was seeking an attachment nor was any hearing 
required before the attachment was authorized.141 Only after the 
attachment was recorded, which served to encumber the defendant’s 
real estate, was the defendant notified of the suit and attachment.142 
Although the Connecticut procedures did not provide a pre-seizure 
notice or hearing, the statute did give the defendant an immediate post-
seizure right to challenge the attachment as lacking in probable 
cause.143 If a challenge to the attachment’s validity was filed, the court 
was required to conduct a prompt hearing (within seven business days) 
on its validity.144 
                                                            
137  Id. at 13-14. 
138  See id. at 14. 
139  See id. at 5-6. Doehr involved a claim in tort, but the statute under attack was 
available for all civil actions and it was struck down on a facial attack rather 
than an as-applied challenge. See id. at 5; see also Pinsky v. Duncan, 898 F.2d 
852, 858 (2d Cir. 1990), aff’d sub nom., 501 U.S. 1 (1991). 
140  Doehr, 501 U.S. at 5 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-278(e) (1991) (amended 
1993)). 
141  See id. 
142  See id. at 7. 
143  See id. The defendant could also petition to replace the property attached with an 
alternate object or with a bond. 
144  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-278(e). 
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As with the Connecticut procedure, a Massachusetts tax deed 
effectuates a taking of the defendant’s property without a hearing,145 
but the property deprivation is more extreme and the procedural 
safeguards are lower. Under the procedure, while the statute does 
require the taxpayer to be notified that a taking is imminent,146 no 
hearing, indeed no judicial review, is required.147 The tax collector, 
strictly on his or her own decision, takes title to the property. Also, 
unlike the less extreme Connecticut attachment procedure found 
deficient in Doehr, the Massachusetts statute provides no way to 
challenge the validity of the taking even after it is effectuated.148 In 
other words, based solely on the unreviewed decision of a 
municipality’s tax collector, the taxpayer’s land is taken with no 
mechanism provided to challenge the validity of the taking.149 Most 
                                                            
145  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60, § 53 (2012) (“If a tax on land is not paid within 
fourteen days after demand therefor and remains unpaid at the date of taking, the 
collector may take such land for the town . . . .”). 
146  See id. (“[T]he collector . . . [must] first giv[e] fourteen days’ notice of his 
intention to exercise such power of taking . . . .”). 
147  See id. (“[T]he collector may take such land for the town . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
148  See id. The only grant of power to the courts in the statute deal with the 
possession of the real estate, not title to it. See id. (“Upon petition of any person 
having a right to redeem such tax title, the superior court for the county within 
which the land lies, if it adjudges justice and the circumstances so warrant, may, 
upon such terms as it shall deem equitable, enjoin a taking of possession under 
this section or command the surrender of a possession taken.”). The statute does 
not grant the court the power to return title to the taxpayer. The authority of the 
Land Court in the foreclosure of the redemption suit seems likewise 
circumspect. The taxpayer is allowed to seek to redeem the property but only for 
the amount fixed by the court. See id. § 68. The court is not authorized to 
evaluate the legality of the taking itself. See id. 
149  There are at least two possible non-statutory remedies available to a taxpayer to 
attempt to recover title to the property, neither of which may prove adequate. 
First, should the tax collector choose to foreclose the right of redemption 
associated with the tax deed, the taxpayer will be heard about the amount that is 
owed, but most other challenges to the tax assessment will not be cognizable by 
the court. See Howard v. Dunster, 120 N.E. 849, 849 (Mass. 1918) (“[I]t is only 
when the tax is wholly without validity that it can be disputed by way of defense 
to an action to recover the tax . . . .”). Second, a Massachusetts court may have 
sufficient general equitable powers to order a tax collector to return the real 
estate to the taxpayer, see, e.g., Johnson v. Superintendent, Mass. St. Police, 624 
N.E.2d 542, 544 (Mass. 1993), but many grounds for the challenge to the tax 
deed title may have already been waived, see, e.g., Tax Collector of Braintree v. 
J.G. Grant & Sons, Inc., 532 N.E.2d 79, 81-82 (Mass. App. 1989). As the 
Supreme Judicial Court stated in Sydney v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 
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significantly, the tax deed does not assert a security interest as was 
done by the Connecticut procedure; instead, fee simple title is taken.150 
Should the tax collector choose, the taxpayer can be ousted 
immediately and the town can take possession of the property.151 All 
of this can occur without any judicial review. 
As discussed in more depth above,152 there are some systematic 
problems in the structure of the Massachusetts real estate tax collection 
apparatus that raise the possibility of an error occurring. Of all of the 
possible mistakes described, the most common is likely to be the 
misdirection of a payment. Consider this hypothetical: 
A taxpayer comes into town hall to make a real estate 
tax payment. The tax collector mistakenly credits the 
payment to another taxpayer’s account. Subsequently, 
when the taxpayer’s account is flagged as delinquent, 
the tax collector sends notice that the property will be 
taken by tax deed. The taxpayer goes to town hall to 
object, but cannot convince the tax collector that a 
mistake has been made. The tax collector executes and 
records the tax deed and takes title to the real estate. 
The kind of mistake highlighted in the hypothetical is exactly the 
kind of mistake that can be corrected with a hearing before a taking is 
done. Correcting the mistake after the fact is not sufficient,153 
                                                                                                                                            
356 N.E.2d 460, 463 (Mass. 1976), “Unless the administrative remedy is 
‘seriously inadequate’ under all the conditions of the case, it should not be 
displaced by an action for a declaration . . . and care must be taken lest 
allowance of a judicial substitute disrupt unduly the orderly collection of tax.” 
The conclusion is that challenging the title transferred to the municipality by a 
tax deed will be daunting, at best, and impossible, at worst. 
150  Compare Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1991) (describing the security 
interest provided by the Connecticut procedure), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 60, 
§ 53 (authorizing the tax collector to take both “title” and “possession”). 
151  See § 53. 
152  See supra Section IV.B.2.b. 
153  See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972) (“The Fourteenth Amendment 
draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day or 50-day deprivations of 
property. Any significant taking of property by the State is within the purview of 
the Due Process Clause. While the length and consequent severity of a 
deprivation may be another factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form 
of hearing, it is not decisive of the basic right to a prior hearing of some kind.”). 
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particularly considering the high penalties imposed on a taxpayer who 
redeems the property after the taking.154 
This demonstrates that the exigency existing in the appropriation 
of real estate title by a tax deed is significantly lower than that of a 
Connecticut attachment; in fact, it barely exists. Taxes assessed against 
real estate in Massachusetts automatically become a lien on the real 
estate making the municipality a secured creditor of the taxpayer.155 
Even if there is a sale of the real estate against which taxes are owed, 
the subsequent owner consequently takes title subject to the taxes.156 
This stands in stark contrast to the attachment process in Doehr as, 
without the attachment, a defendant is free to convey the property 
without concern for any desire the plaintiff may have to use it to 
satisfy the debt. The net result is that a municipality in Massachusetts 
has no exigency to justify taking the taxpayer’s property without a 
hearing. 
4. Conclusion 
Even recognizing that “[t]he formality and procedural requisites 
for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the 
interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings,”157 
Massachusetts tax deeds procedurally fail as they allow the 
municipality to take the taxpayer’s property without providing a pre-
seizure hearing; indeed, no procedure is provided for the taxpayer to 
obtain an immediate post-seizure hearing. As no exigency justifies this 
lack, the tax deed is procedurally deficient under the Due Process 
Clause. 
                                                            
154  See §§ 15 & 55. The interest charges are particularly onerous. See id; see also 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 57 (2007) (imposing a fourteen percent rate from 
nonpayment to taking); ch. 60, § 62 (imposing a sixteen percent rate from the 
taking to the foreclosure of the redemption); see also Tallage LLC v. Meaney, 
2015 WL 4207424, at *2, 23 LCR (Landlaw) 375 (Mass. Land Ct. 2015). 
155  See ch. 60, § 37. 
156  See City of Boston v. Quincy Mkt. Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., 45 N.E.2d 
959, 964 (Mass. 1942) (“The real estate of the owner in fact is charged with a 
lien for the payment of the tax thereon irrespective of the person to whom the 
tax is assessed, though the person to whom it is assessed is primarily liable 
therefor.”); Hanna v. Town of Framingham, 802 N.E.2d 1061, 1066 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2004) (“[T]he town’s lien securing payment of real estate taxes arises 
automatically.”). 
157  Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Massachusetts tax deeds fail federal and state due process scrutiny 
for two reasons. First, they allow the municipalities to keep property 
that is significantly beyond the amount for which they have a claim. 
Second, they allow a municipality to take title from the taxpayer 
without providing a pre-seizure hearing. Neither problem is acceptable 
under constitutional analysis. 
Because of the seriousness of the problem, tax deeds under 
Chapter 60 of the General Laws should no longer be recognized; 
instead, one of the alternate methods of tax collection should be 
required. When presented with a tax deed or the foreclosure of the 
right of redemption flowing from them, the courts should refuse to 
enforce them as they violate the taxpayer’s due process rights and 
should declare that they are not sufficient to convey title from the 
taxpayer to the municipality. Whether a party who has received title 
via a tax deed has obtained a valid interest or whether a Section 1983 
action is appropriate to recover for the due process violations that have 
already occurred is left for evaluation by the affected parties and their 
counsel. 
 
